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1  Introduction 
What  are  the  implications  of  borrowing  constraint  for  aggregate  pro 
duction  and  income  distribution?  Kiminori  Matsuyama's  answer  has 
two  aspects.  First,  concerning  the  behavior  of  an  individual  producer, 
the borrowing  constraint  has  a fairly  robust  prediction?that  the  invest 
ment  of  each  producer  depends  upon  its net  worth,  in  addition  to  the 
cost  of  capital  and  the  expected  marginal  product  of  capital.  Secondly, 
concerning  the  aggregate  outcomes,  the  author  argues  that  there  is no 
simple  prediction,  and  that  the  borrowing  constraint  leads  to  a variety 
of  aggregate  predictions,  depending  on  the underlying  environment  (in 
addition  to  the  borrowing  constraint).  The  borrowing  constraint  may 
generate  persistent  movement  of  aggregate  quantities, 
or  may  cause 
volatility.  The  inefficient  production  may  expand  during  recessions  or 
may  be  aggravated  during  booms.  The  improvement  of  the  financial 
system  may  first  increase  the  volatility  of  aggregate  production  before 
reducing  it. 
At  one  level,  this  is an  impressive  piece  of work?a  world  according 
to  Matsuyama.  Like  a  screwdriver  with  exchangeable  heads,  one math 
ematically  simple  framework  with  borrowing  constraint  brings  in vari 
eties  of  results  in business  cycles,  development,  and  capital  flows,  de 
pending  on  the  attachments. 
At  another  level,  I find  that  the model  is complicated  in  terms  of  the 
ory,  even  if  it  may  be  simple  in  terms  of mathematics.  Hereafter  I am 
going  to be  as  critical  as  possible  in order  to highlight  the  differences 
between  the  author  and  me,  even  though  I  agree  to many  of  his 
arguments. 
Let me  first  lay  out  the  key  assumptions  of his  basic  model: 72 Kiyotaki 
1. Agents  are  homogeneous. 
2.  Projects  are  indivisible  and  there  is no  lottery. 
3.  Agents  face  borrowing  constraints. 
4.  Agents  receive  credit  by  the  rule  of  the  first-come-first-serve. 
5.  Overlapping  generations  model  with  each  agent  living  for  two  pe 
riods. 
6.  Agents  choose  one  project  from  a  menu  of  projects. 
(a)  Productive  versus  unproductive; 
(b)  Pledgeable  versus  not-so-pledgeable; 
(c)  Produce  capital  versus  produce  consumption  goods. 
Do  we  really  need  all  six of  these  assumptions?  Assumptions  of  (1) ho 
mogeneous  agent,  (2)  indivisible  project,  and  (4) credit  rationing  are not 
essential.  Here,  because  the  agents  are  homogeneous,  there  are  neither 
natural  lenders  nor  borrowers.  The  only  reason  for borrowing  is that  the 
minimum  scale  of  investment  is  larger  than  the  saving  of  an  individual 
agent  and  there  is no  lottery.  (If  there  were  a  lottery  so  that  the winner 
could  get  enough  funds  to  finance  the  project,  there would  be  no  need 
for borrowing.)  Because  people  earn  higher  returns  if they  receive  credit 
to  finance  the  project  when  the  borrowing  constraint  is binding,  credit 
rationing  is needed  in  the  equilibrium.  Thus,  the  role  of  finance  in  this 
paper  is to  transfer  the purchasing  power  from  those who  are back  in the 
queue  (unlucky  agents)  to  those  who  are  in  front  of  the  queue  (lucky 
ones).  This  is  a  complicated  theory  of  credit,  because  there  are many 
auxiliary  assumptions.11  think  it  is  more  natural  to  consider  that  the  fi 
nancial  system  transfers  funds  from  those  who  have  them  to  those  who 
have  investment  opportunity,  because  the producers  and  consumers  are 
genuinely  heterogeneous. 
Assumption  of  (5) overlapping  generations  model  is  more  substantial 
than  the  assumptions  of  (1),  (2),  and  (4). But,  because  the  overlapping 
generations  model  is  rich  by  itself,  it  is difficult  to  clearly  understand 
how  many  of  the  results  are  due  to  the  borrowing  constraint  instead  of 
the  overlapping-generations  model. 
Can  we  develop  an  argument  similar  to  the  author's,  only  with  the  as 
sumption  of  (3) borrowing  constraint  with  heterogeneous  agents?  Here, 
we  can  use  the  insight  that  the  overlapping-generations  model  is  iso 
morphic  to  some  credit-constrained  economy.  (See,  e.g.,  Woodford 
[1986,  1990]  and  Aiyagari  [1989,  1992]).  Then  the  overlapping  genera Comment  73 
tions  feature  would  be  a  result  of  the  borrowing  constraint,  not  the  as 
sumption. 
2  Alternative  Model 
We  consider  an  infinite  horizon  economy  with  homogeneous  output, 
capital  and  labor  at  each  date.2  There  are  two  (even  and  odd)  types  of  a 
continuum  of  infinitely  lived  agents.  The  population  size  of  each  type  of 
agents  is normalized  as  unity.  Each  even-type  agent  supplies  labor  in 
elastically  and  has  technology  to  invest  goods  in every  even  number  of 
date  as: 
yt=f(kt)=Akf,0<A,0<a<l.  (1) 
where  yt  is gross  output  at date  t and  kt is gross  investment  on  capital  at 
date  t -1,  where  t -1  is an  even  number.3  Each  odd-type  agent  supplies 
labor  and  invests  on  the  same  technology  in every  odd  number  of  date. 




Xr'lncs,0<p<l  (2) 
where  c$ is consumption  at date  s and  In c  is natural  log  of  c. Goods  are 
storable  between  periods  with  the  gross  rate  of  return  B <  1/p. 
Let  c\ be  consumption  of  the  agent  who  is  investing  (even  type  if  t = 
even,  odd  type  if  t = 
odd)  and  let  cht  be  consumption  of  the  agent  who  is 
harvesting  (odd  type  if t =  even,  even  type  if t = 
odd).  The  resource  con 
straint  of  the  economy  can  be written  as: 
c\ +  ct  +  kt+i +  zt+1 
= 
Ak?  +  Bzt,  (3) 
where  zt  is storage  between  date  t -1  and  date  t. 
We  can  immediately  see  the  first  best  allocation  starting  from  the  ini 
tial  capital  stock,  which  is not  very  different  from  the  steady  state  level, 
should  satisfy  the  conditions: 
zt+i 
= 
0,  (4) 
kt+1 
= 
a(3Afc?,  (5) 




a(3)Afc?  (6) 
Equation  (4)  implies  there  should  be  no  storage  in  the  first  best  alloca 
tion,  because  the  rate  of  returns  is  less  than  the  time  preference  rate. 
Equation  (5)  implies  the  gross  saving  rate  is constant  and  equal  to ocp in 74 Kiyotaki 
the  efficient  allocation,  which  is  similar  to  the model  of  Brock  and Mir 
man  (1972). 
In  the market  economy,  in  contrast  to  the  first  best,  each  agent  faces 
the borrowing  constraint.  Following  the  author,  we  assume  that  the bor 
rower  can  borrow  as  long  as  the  debt  repayment  of  the  next  period  dt+1 
does  not  exceed  the  constant  fraction  X of  returns  from  the  present  in 
vestment  kt+1: 
dt+1<XRt+1kt+1,  (7) 
where  Rt+1  is  the  gross  rate  of  returns  on  the  capital  investment  from 
date  t to  t +  1. The  flow-of-fund  constraint  of  the  agent  who  is  investing 
at date  t implies 
c\ +  kt+1 
= 
wt  +  lt  +  Bzt  +  -^-.  (8) 
Here,  his  expenditure  on  consumption  and  investment  in  the  left-hand 
side  (LHS)  is  financed  by  the wage  income  wt,  the  returns  from  loan  lt, 
and  storage,  in addition  to  the borrowing  dt+1/rt  (where  rt is the gross  real 
interest  rate)  in  the  right-hand  side  (RHS). We  conjecture  the  investing 
agent  does  not  store,  which  can  be  verified  later. 
For  the  agent  who  is  harvesting,  the  flow-of-fund  constraint  implies 




dr  (9) 
His  returns  on  the  investment  of  the previous  period  after  repaying  the 
debt  in  the RHS  is used  to  finance  consumption,  loan  lt+1/rt and  storage 
in  the LHS. 
The  competitive-market  equilibrium  implies  the  factor  prices  are 
equal  to  the marginal  products: 
Rt=f'(kt) 
= 





a)Afc?,  (11) 
where  kt is aggregate  capital  stock,  which  is equal  to  kt  in  equilibrium. 
The  credit-market  clearing  condition  is: 
lt+1 
= 
dt+v  (12) 
Although  the  goods-market  clearing  is given  by  equation  (3), one  of  the 
market-clearing  conditions  is not  independent  by Walras'  law. The  com 
petitive  equilibrium  is defined  as  a  set  of prices  (Rt, wt,  rt) and  quantities Comment  75 
(c\,  c\,  kt+1, zt+1, dt+1,  lt+1) as  a  function  of  the  state  variables  (kt, zt,  dt,  lt), 
which  satisfies  the  utility  maximization  of  each  agent  and  the market 
clearing  conditions. 
We  can  show  that,  if the borrowing  constraint  is not  tight,  that  is, X  is 
larger  than  the  threshold,  then  the borrowing  constraint  is not  binding 
and  the  allocation  is  the  first  best. 
We  can  also  show  that  if the borrowing  constraint  is  tight  (X is small), 
then  the  economy  is credit  constrained.  The  credit-constrained  equilib 
rium  exhibits  many  features  that  the  author  emphasizes  in his  paper. 
(a) Investment  is an  increasing  function  of  the net  worth  of  the  invest 
ing  agents: 





'  (13) 
where  the numerator  is the gross  saving  of  the  investing  agents?the  net 
worth  minus  the  consumption.  The  denominator  is  the  down  payment 
required  for  the  investment  of  one  unit?the  gap  between  the  cost  of  in 
vestment  of  one  unit  and  the maximum  amount  of borrowing  available. 
The  investing  agents  use  gross  saving  to  finance  the  gap  between  the 
cost  of  investment  and  the  amount  of  external  finance. 
(b) Net  worth  of  the  investing  agents  is an  increasing  function  of  in 
vestment  and  storage  of  the previous  period  in  the  equilibrium: 
wt  +  lt  +  Bzt 
= 
(1 
-  a  +  Xa)Ak?  +  Bzr 
(c)  Inefficient  storage  is used  and  the  real  interest  rate  to  the  savers  is 
lower  than  the  time-preference  rate: 
zt  >  0,  and  rt 
=  B<?. 
(d) Consumption  of  individual  agents  is larger  at harvesting  time  than 
investing  time: 
c\  1 
c\+1  PB 
c\ 
P 1  ~ 
(XRt+1/rt) 
Here,  because  the  investing  agents  save  more  than  harvesting  agents, 
the  aggregate  saving  is  an  increasing  function  of  the  ratio  of  the  net 
worth  of  the  investing  agents  and  that  of  the harvesting  agents.  This  as 76 Kiyotaki 
sociation  of  income  distribution  and  aggregate  saving  is common  to  the 
overlapping-generations  model,  even  though  it is not  as  extreme  as  the 
overlapping-generations  model  (in which  the  harvesting  agents  con 
sume  everything). 
Here,  as  the  author  emphasizes,  the present  distribution  of wealth  af 
fects  the  present  investment,  as  seen  in  (a),  and  the  present  investment 
affects  the  future  wealth  distribution  as  seen  (b). This  contemporaneous 
and  intertemporal  interaction  between  the wealth  distribution  and  the 
investment  is  the  unique  feature  of  the  credit-constrained  economy. 
Combining  (a)  and  (b) with  the  other  market  clearing  conditions,  we 
have: 
_  (1 







'  (14) 
zt+1 
= 
Ak?  +  Bzt 
- 
kt+1 -c\-  c\.  (15) 
This  dynamic  interaction  between  the wealth  distribution  and  invest 
ment  may  generate  rich  dynamics  of  aggregate  economic  activities.  The 
movement  of  the  aggregate  quantities  is persistent  because  the  present 
investment  depends  on  the net worth  of  the  investing  agents,  which  is a 
function  of  the  previous  investments.  The  aggregate  quantities  may  be 
more  volatile,  because  the  net  worth  of  the  investing  agents  affect  the 
compositions  of  the  productive  capital  investment  and  the  unproduc 
tive  storage,  which  changes  the  total  factor  productivity  (TFP)  endoge 
nously. 
Although  this  alternative  model  shares  many  features  of  the  author's 
model,  this model,  with  infinitely  lived  agents,  is  more  difficult  to gen 
erate  exotic  nonlinear  dynamics  than  the  author's  overlapping  genera 
tions  model  with  indivisible  project.  But  I do  not  consider  this  is  the 
shortcoming  of  the  alternative  model,  because  the  income  distribution 
tends  to move  more  sluggishly  than  the  growth  rate  of  output  during 
the business  cycle. 
3  Conclusion 
Perhaps  it may  be  a  violation  of  etiquette  to  present  an  alternative 
model.  I agree  with  the  author  that  the  borrowing  constraint  is  impor 
tant  for  understanding  the  various  features  of  aggregate  economic  ac 
tivities.  I also  consider  that  the  borrowing  constraint  (or  more  broadly, 
the  liquidity  constraint)  helps  in understanding  the  various  features  of Comment  77 
the monetary  economy  that  the  author  did  not  address.  Namely,  money 
is used  as  the medium  of  exchange,  as  the means  of  short-term  saving, 
and  as  the unit  of  contracts.  Therefore,  the  researchers  on  the  subject  of 
liquidity  constraints  must  communicate  well  with  other  researchers  in 
order  to have  an  impact  on  the way  people  understand  the  economy. 
Criteria  for  good  communication  include  simplicity  of  theory  and  how 
well  the  simple  theory  empirically  explains  the  observations.  Finally, 
concerning  simplicity  of  theory,  it is  important  to explain  the wide  phe 
nomena  as  clearly  as possible  with  the minimum  number  of  auxiliary  as 
sumptions. 
Endnotes 
1.  In  remark  3,  the  author  argues  that  the  credit  rationing  is not  needed  if the  initial  wealth 
of  the  investing  agents  are  different  and  the  difference  is  converging  to  zero  in  the  limit. 
However,  I still  think  it artificial  that  agents  who  have  a penny  more  than  the  average  in 
vest,  while  agents  who  have  a penny  less  do  not  invest.  If agents  have  some  flexibility  in 
choosing  the  size  of  project,  or  if  there  is a  lottery,  then  the  borrowing  would  become  neg 
ligible  as  the  agents  become  essentially  homogeneous. 
2.  This  model  is based  on Woodford  (1990)  and  Kiyotaki  and Moore  (2001,2005). 
3.  Thus  kt  is  capital  stock  at  the  beginning  of  date  t,  which  is  invested  at date  t-\.  Here,  I 
follow  the  author's  notations  of  capital  investment  as  closely  as  possible. 
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